We employ the term "political culture" for two reasons. First, if we are to ascertain the relationships between political and nonpolitical attitudes and developmental patterns, we have to separate the former from the latter even though the boundary between them is not as sharp as our terminology would suggest. The term "political culture" thus refers to the specifically political orientations — attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. We speak of a political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes.

But we also choose political *culture*, rather than some other special concept, because it enables us to utilize the conceptual frameworks and approaches of anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Our thinking is enriched when we employ, for example, such categories of anthropology and psy-

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ter and political culture is Lucian W. Pye's *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*, New Haven, 1962, which both develops a general theory of personality and political attitudes and applies this to a study of Burmese patterns.

Studies of Germany include: R. Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* Philadelphia, 1943; H. V. Dicks, "Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology," *Human Relations*, Vol. III, 1950; David Rodnick, *Postwar Germans*, New Haven, 1948, and Bertram Schaffner, *Fatherland. A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family*, New York, 1948.

Studies of the United States include: Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People*, New York, 1948; Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, New York, 1942, and David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, 1950.

Studies of Russia include: H. V. Dicks, "Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior," *Human Relations*, Vol. V, 1952; Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, *The People of Great Russia*, London, 1949; Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, Glencoe, Ill., 1953; Margaret Mead, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority*, New York, 1951, and Dinko Tomasic, *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism*, Glencoe, 1953.

For England, see Geoffrey Gorer, *Exploring English Character*, New York, 1955. For France, see Nathan Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France*, Stanford, 1959; Rhoda Metraux and Margaret Mead, *Themes in French Culture*, Stanford, 1954, and Lawrence Wylie, *Village in The Vaucluse*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957. And for Japan, see Ruth F. Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and The Sword*, Boston, 1946.

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chology as socialization, culture conflict, and acculturation. Similarly, our capacity to understand the emergence and transformation of political systems grows when we draw upon the body of theory and speculation concerned with the general phenomena of social structure and process.

We appreciate the fact that anthropologists use the term culture in a variety of ways, and that by bringing it into the conceptual vocabulary of political science we are in danger of importing its ambiguities as well as its advantages. Here we can only stress that we employ the concept of culture in only one of its many meanings: that of *psychological orientation toward social objects.* When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are inducted into it just as they are socialized into nonpolitical roles and social systems. Conflicts of political cultures have much in common with other culture conflicts, and political acculturative processes are more understandable if we view them in the light of the resistances and the fusional and incorporative tendencies of cultural change in general.

Thus the concept of political culture helps us to escape from the diffuseness of such general anthropological terms as cultural ethos and from the assumption of homogeneity that the concept implies. It enables us to formulate hypotheses about relationships among the different components of culture and to test these hypotheses empirically. With the concept of political socialization we can go beyond the rather simple assumptions of the psychocultural school regarding relationships between general child development patterns and adult political attitudes. We can relate specific adult political attitudes and behavioral propensities to the manifest and latent political socialization experiences of childhood.

The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation. Before we can arrive at such distributions, we need to have some way of systematically tapping individual orientations toward political objects. In other words, we need to define and specify modes of political orientation and classes of political objects. Our definition and

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classification of types of political orientation follow Parsons and Shils, as has been suggested elsewhere.[7] "Orientation" refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes (1) "cognitive orientation," that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; (2) "affective orientation," or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) "evaluational orientation," the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.

In classifying objects of political orientation, we start with the "general" political system. We deal here with the system as a whole and include such feelings as patriotism or alienation, such cognitions and evaluations of the nation as "large" or "small," "strong" or "weak," and of the polity as "democratic," "constitutional," or "socialistic." At the other extreme we distinguish orientations toward the "self" as political actor; the content and quality of norms of personal political obligation, and the content and quality of the sense of personal competence vis-à-vis the political system. In treating the component parts of the political system we distinguish, first, three broad classes of objects: (1) specific *roles* or *structures,* such as legislative bodies, executives, or bureaucracies; (2) *incumbents* of roles, such as particular monarchs, legislators, and administrators, and (3) particular public *policies, decisions,* or *enforcements* of decisions. These structures, incumbents, and decisions may in turn be classified broadly by whether they are involved either in the political or "input" process or in the administrative or "output" process. By "political" or "input" process we refer to the flow of demands from the society into the polity and the conversion of these demands into authoritative policies. Some structures that are predominantly involved in the input process are political parties, interest groups, and the media of communication. By the administrative or output process we refer to that process

[7] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. XVIII, 1956; Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action,* Cambridge, Mass., 1951, pp. 53ff.

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by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced. Structures predominantly involved in this process would include bureaucracies and courts.

We realize that any such distinction does violence to the actual continuity of the political process and to the multifunctionality of political structures. Much broad policy is made in bureaucracies and by courts; and structures that we label as input, such as interest groups and political parties, are often concerned with the details of administration and enforcement. What we are referring to is a difference in emphasis, and one that is of great importance in the classification of political cultures. The distinction we draw between participant and subject political cultures turns in part on the presence or absence of orientation toward specialized input structures. For our classification of political cultures it is not of great importance that these specialized input structures are also involved in the performance of enforcement functions and that the specialized administrative ones are involved in the performance of input functions. The important thing for our classification is what political objects individuals are oriented to, how they are oriented to them, and whether these objects are predominantly involved in the "upward" flow of policy making or in the "downward" flow of policy enforcement. We shall treat this problem in greater detail when we define the major classes of political culture.

TABLE I.1 *Dimensions of political orientation*

| | *1. System as general object* | *2. Input objects* | *3. Output objects* | *4. Self as object* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cognition | | | | |
| Affect | | | | |
| Evaluation | | | | |

We can consolidate what we have thus far said about individual orientations toward the polity in a simple 3 x 4 matrix. Table I.1 tells us that the political orientation of an individual can be tapped systematically if we explore the following:

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1. What knowledge does he have of his nation and of his political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power, "constitutional" characteristics, and the like? What are his feelings toward these systemic characteristics? What are his more or less considered opinions and judgments of them?

2. What knowledge does he have of the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making? What are his feelings and opinions about these structures, leaders, and policy proposals?

3. What knowledge does he have of the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes? What are his feelings and opinions of them?

TABLE I.2 *Types of political culture*

| | *System as general object* | *Input objects* | *Output objects* | *Self as active participant* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parochial | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subject | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Participant | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

4. How does he perceive of himself as a member of his political system? What knowledge does he have of his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence? How does he feel about his capabilities? What norms of participation or of performance does he acknowledge and employ in formulating political judgments, or in arriving at opinions?

Characterizing the political culture of a nation means, in effect, filling in such a matrix for a valid sample of its population. The political culture becomes the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor.

*Parochial Political Culture.* When this frequency of orientations to specialized political objects of the four kinds specified in Table I.2 approaches zero, we can speak of the po-

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litical culture as a parochial one. The political cultures of African tribal societies and autonomous local communities referred to by Coleman[8] would fall into this category. In these societies there are no specialized political roles: headmanship, chieftainship, "shamanship" are diffuse political–economic–religious roles, and for members of these societies the political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing from the political system. Similarly, in the centralized African chiefdoms and kingdoms to which Coleman refers, the political cultures would be predominantly parochial, although the development of somewhat more specialized roles in these societies might mean the beginnings of more differentiated political orientations. Even larger-scale and more differentiated polities, however, may have predominantly parochial cultures. But relatively pure parochialism is likely to occur in simpler traditional systems where political specialization is minimal. Parochialism in more differentiated political systems is likely to be affective and normative rather than cognitive. That is to say, the remote tribesmen in Nigeria or Ghana may be aware in a dim sort of way of the existence of a central political regime. But his feelings toward it are uncertain or negative, and he has not internalized any norms to regulate his relations to it.

*The Subject Political Culture.* The second major type of political culture listed in Table I.2 is the subject culture. Here there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero. The subject is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general level, and toward the output, administrative, or "downward flow" side of the political system; it is essentially a pas-

[8] Almond and Coleman, *Politics of the Developing Areas*, p. 254.

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sive relationship, although there is, as we shall show below, a limited form of competence that is appropriate in a subject culture.

Again we are speaking of the pure subject orientation that is likely to exist in a society in which there is no differentiated input structure. The subject orientation in political systems that have developed democratic institutions is likely to be affective and normative rather than cognitive. Thus a French royalist is aware of democratic institutions; he simply does not accord legitimacy to them.

*The Participant Political Culture.* The third major type of political culture, the participant culture, is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and adminstrative structures and processes: in other words, to both the input and output aspects of the political system. Individual members of the participant polity may be favorably or unfavorably oriented to the various classes of political objects. They tend to be oriented toward an "activist" role of the self in the polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary from acceptance to rejection, as we shall show below.

This threefold classification of political cultures does not assume that one orientation replaces the others. The subject culture does not eliminate diffuse orientations to the primary and intimate structures of community. To the diffuse orientations to lineage groups, religious community, and village it adds a specialized subject orientation to the governmental institutions. Similarly, the participant culture does not supplant the subject and parochial patterns of orientation. The participant culture is an additional stratum that may be added to and combined with the subject and parochial cultures. Thus the citizen of a participant polity is not only oriented toward active participation in politics, but is also subject to law and authority and is a member of more diffuse primary groups.

To be sure, adding participant orientations to subject and parochial orientations does not leave these "earlier" orientations unchanged. The parochial orientations must adapt when new and more specialized orientations enter into the

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puts. We need not apologize for this emphasis, but must point out how this choice may tend to obscure significant dimensions of political culture, and significant relationships between general psychocultural patterns and the substance of politics and public policy. A study that stressed orientation to public policy would require at least as much of a major effort as the present one. It would have to relate systematically types of public policy orientations to types of social structure and cultural values, as well as to the socialization processes with which they are related. A similarly rigorous separation of public policy orientation, general culture orientation, and socialization patterns would also be necessary, in order for us to discover the real character and direction of relationships among these phenomena.

## THE CIVIC CULTURE: A MIXED POLITICAL CULTURE

At an earlier point we discussed the historical origins of the civic culture and the functions of that culture in the process of social change. Much of this book will offer an analysis and description of the culture and of the role it plays in the maintenance of a democratic political system. It will be useful therefore to spell out, if only briefly, some of its main characteristics.

The civic culture is not the political culture that one finds described in civics textbooks, which prescribe the way in which citizens ought to act in a democracy. The norms of citizen behavior found in these texts stress the participant aspects of political culture. The democratic citizen is expected to be active in politics and to be involved. Furthermore, he is supposed to be rational in his approach to politics, guided by reason, not by emotion. He is supposed to be well informed and to make decisions — for instance, his decision on how to vote — on the basis of careful calculation as to the interests and the principles he would like to see furthered. This culture, with its stress on rational participation within the input structures of politics, we can label the "rationality-activist" model of political culture. The civic culture shares much with this rationality-activist model; it is, in fact, such a culture *plus something else*. It does stress the par-

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ticipation of individuals in the political input process. In the civic cultures described in this volume we shall find high frequencies of political activity, of exposure to political communications, of political discussion, of concern with political affairs. But there is *something else.*

In the first place, the civic culture is an allegiant participant culture. Individuals are not only oriented to political input, they also are oriented positively to the input structures and the input process. In other words, to use the terms introduced earlier, the civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent.

More important, in the civic culture participant political orientations combine with and do not replace subject and parochial political orientations. Individuals become participants in the political process, but they do not give up their orientations as subjects or as parochials. Furthermore, not only are these earlier orientations maintained, alongside the participant political orientations, but the subject and parochial orientations are also congruent with the participant political orientations. The nonparticipant, more traditional political orientations tend to limit the individual's commitment to politics and to make that commitment milder. In a sense, the subject and parochial orientations "manage" or keep in place the participant political orientations. Thus attitudes favorable to participation within the political system play a major role in the civic culture, but so do such nonpolitical attitudes as trust in other people and social participation in general. The maintenance of these more traditional attitudes *and their fusion* with the participant orientations lead to a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values.

## MICRO- AND MACROPOLITICS: POLITICAL CULTURE AS THE CONNECTING LINK

Developments in social science methods in recent decades have enabled us to penetrate more deeply into the motivational basis of the political attitudes and behavior of indi-

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